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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gracie Jean Tryon appealed from her conviction for possession of a controlled substance,
following a jury trial.  Ms. Tryon asserted the district court erred when it permitted the admission
of certain statements by a witness, Carl Ringcamp, touching on the identity of the substance at
issue, because that violated her constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her.  She
also asserted the State did not present sufficient evidence to support her conviction for
possession of a controlled substance.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues Ms. Tryon did not show any error in the
admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements, because she waived any objection by telling the jury
about the statements during her opening statement, and the statements were not testimonial for
purposes  of  the  Confrontation  Clause.   (See Resp. Br., pp.6-16.)  The State also argues
Ms. Tryon did not show the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.  (See Resp.
Br., pp.17-19.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments, which are unavailing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Tryon’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I. Did the district court err when it permitted the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements,
because that violated Ms. Tryon’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against her?
II. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support Ms. Tryon’s conviction for




The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Admission Of Mr. Ringcamp’s Statements,
Because That Violated Ms. Tryon’s Constitutional Right To Confront The Witnesses
Against Her
A. Introduction
Ms.  Tryon  asserts  the  district  court  erred  when  it  permitted  the  admission,  through
Detective Matthew Richardson, of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements touching on the identity of the
substance at issue.  The admission of the statements violated Ms. Tryon’s constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against her.  The district court determined there was no confrontation
issue because Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were nontestimonial.  (See Tr., p.160, Ls.11-15.)
However, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were actually testimonial, because the circumstances
objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation in this case was to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. See Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006).  Because Ms. Tryon did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine
Mr. Ringcamp, his statements were inadmissible.  The State has not proven the admission of
Mr. Ringcamp’s statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Ms.  Tryon  Did  Not  Waive  Her  Objection  To  The  Admission  Of  Mr.  Ringcamp’s
Statements
As a preliminary matter, Ms. Tryon asserts she did not waive her Confrontation Clause
objection to the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements.   The State argues Ms. Tryon waived
any objection to the admission of the statements.  (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)  The State contends that,
because Ms. Tryon mentioned the statements during her opening statement, she “waived any
argument that her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the subsequent
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admission  of  such  testimony.”   (See Resp. Br., p.8.)  The State also argues, “[a]lthough the
district court did not make a ruling on whether [Ms.] Tryon had waived her confrontation clause
issue, the court’s ruling admitting [Mr.] Ringcamp’s statements should be affirmed on this
alternative basis.”  (Resp. Br., p.8.)
The  State  suggests  Ms.  Tryon  waived  her  objection  under  the  “invited  error”  doctrine.
(See Resp. Br., p.8.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held, regarding the invited error doctrine,
“[i]t has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of errors one has
acquiesced in or invited.  Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not reversible.”
State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838 (1983) (citation omitted).
Contrary to the State’s argument, the invited error doctrine does not apply here.
Ms. Tryon’s mere mention of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements in her opening statement did not mean
she consented to, acquiesced in, or invited their admission.  A civil fraud case, Herrick v.
Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293 (Ct. App. 1995), helps illustrate why.  In Herrick, the Herricks sought
to introduce into evidence a letter indicating they had been given the property at issue, but the
district court excluded that exhibit for lack of foundation. See Herrick, 127 Idaho at 302.  On
appeal, the Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he Herricks made no effort to lay a foundation for
admission of the letter through any witness.  Instead, they argued only that the Leuzingers’
attorney had opened the door for admission of this letter by referring to it in his opening
statement to the jury.” Id. at 302-03.
The Herrick Court  wrote,  “[t]his contention by the Herricks that reference to an exhibit
during an opening statement will waive any objection when the exhibit is offered during the trial
has not been supported by any citation of authority, and we find it to be without merit.” Id. at
303.  According to the Court, “[a]ttorneys’ opening statements often comment upon anticipated
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adverse evidence in order to defuse its impact or diminish its importance.” Id.  The  Court
perceived “no reason that such a comment should excuse the proponent of the evidence from
laying an adequate foundation for its admission.” Id.  Thus, the Herrick Court  held,  “the  trial
court’s exclusion of this letter was not in error.” Id.
Based on Herrick, the State’s contention that Ms. Tryon waived her objection is likewise
without  merit.   That  Ms.  Tryon  commented  on  Mr.  Ringcamp’s  statements,  as  anticipated
adverse evidence, did not excuse the State from showing the statements were admissible. See id.
Put otherwise, the mere mention of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements did not invite the district court’s
error in permitting the admission of the statements in violation of Ms. Tryon’s constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against her.
Additionally, this is not a situation where Ms. Tryon invited the error by stipulating or
otherwise agreeing to the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements as evidence. Cf. State v.
Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 187 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding any error in the admission of an
interrogation transcript was invited error, where defense counsel had stipulated to the admission
of  the  transcript).   Opening  statements  are  not  evidence.   The  Idaho  Supreme  Court  has  held,
“[o]pening statements serve to inform the jury of the issues of the case and briefly outline the
evidence each litigant intends to introduce to support his allegations or defenses, as the case may
be.” State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56 (1975).  The Griffith Court  also  held  that,  “[g]enerally,
opening remarks should be confined to a brief summary of evidence counsel expects to introduce
on behalf of his client’s case-in-chief.  Counsel should not at that time attempt to impeach or
otherwise argue the merits of evidence that the opposing side has or will present.” Id.  Indeed,
the district court instructed the jury here, “[j]ust as the opening statements are not evidence,
neither are the closing arguments.”  (Tr., p.110, Ls.18-20.)
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The situation in this case also presents parallels with State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311
(Ct. App. 1988).  In Boehner, the defendant referenced a certain matter (statements allegedly
made by the defendant that he had a desire to “kill a cop”) during voir dire, and the state later
sought to introduce rebuttal evidence on that matter in its case in chief. See id. at  313.   On
appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals held, “[t]he state cannot bootstrap rebuttal testimony into its
case-in-chief by anticipating a defense and then characterizing the unmade defense as a material
issue.  If this does occur, the defendant is denied his right to choose whether, and how, to raise
certain defenses.” Id. at 318.  Ms. Tryon’s reference to Mr. Ringcamp’s statements during her
opening statement, much like the defendant’s reference during voir dire in Boehner, did not open
the door for the State to admit the statements.1
In sum, the State’s invited error argument is unavailing.  Ms. Tryon’s mere mention of
Mr. Ringcamp’s statements during her opening statement did not mean she consented to,
acquiesced in, or invited their admission. See Herrick, 127 Idaho at 303.  Thus, the invited error
doctrine does not apply here, and Ms. Tryon did not waive her Confrontation Clause objection to
the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements.
C. The  Admission  Of  Mr.  Ringcamp’s  Statements  Violated  Ms.  Tryon’s  Constitutional
Right To Confront The Witnesses Against Her
Ms. Tryon asserts the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements violated her constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against her.  Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were testimonial,
because the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation in
1 For the Court’s information, the Idaho Court of Appeals addressed another similar issue in an
unpublished opinion, State v. Agafonov, No. 38764, 2012 WL 9496436 (Ct. App. Nov. 27,
2012).  In Agafonov, the Court held, “statements during opening argument by the defendant do
not open the door to rebuttal evidence by the prosecution during its case in chief.” Id. at *6.
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this case was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
The State argues “the challenged statements were not testimonial, and, therefore, their
admission did not violate [Ms.] Tryon’s confrontation rights.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.)  The State
contends that the primary purpose of the interrogation, “whether viewed from Detective
Richardson’s question, [Mr.] Ringcamp’s answer, or both, was not to create a record for trial, or
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, in order to prove that the substance found in
[Ms.] Tryon’s purse was, in fact, methamphetamine.”  (Resp. Br., p.14.)
The State would essentially have the Court adopt the argument the United States
Supreme Court rejected in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).  Here, the
State  bases  its  argument  above  on  the  following  remarks  by  the  prosecutor  before  the  district
court: “I don’t think anyone at the time would have possibly guessed that the statement, ‘that’s
my meth,’ which is made purely to exculpate this particular defendant, would be used later to
prove that it was meth.”  (Resp. Br., pp.13-14 (quoting Tr., p.155, Ls.16-21).)
As Ms. Tryon previously discussed (see App. Br., p.13), the Melendez-Diaz Court
rejected the argument that the analysts who prepared the forensic reports at issue were “not
subject to confrontation because they are not ‘accusatory’ witnesses, in that they do not directly
accuse petitioner of wrongdoing; rather, their testimony is inculpatory only when taken together
with other evidence linking petitioner to the contraband.” See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313.
Thus, much like the testimony of the analysts in Melendez-Diaz, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements
were against Ms. Tryon, helping to prove one fact necessary for her conviction—that the
substance at issue was methamphetamine. See id. at  313   Even  though  the  statements  were
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“inculpatory only when taken together with other evidence linking [Ms. Tryon] to the
contraband,” see id., they were still testimonial.
The State’s argument also contradicts the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in State v.
Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327 (2015).  The State’s argument appears to draw from the plurality
opinion in Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), which held evidence was nontestimonial
because its primary purpose was not to create evidence against the defendant. See Williams, 567
U.S. at 84-85 (plurality opinion).  However, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, agreed the
evidence was nontestimonial but solely because it lacked the requisite formality and solemnity,
id. at 103-04 (Thomas, J., concurring), and the four dissenting justices rejected the plurality’s
accusatory requirement, id. at 134-35 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
In light of the fractured opinion in Williams, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Stanfield,
“[b]ecause no position received support from a majority of the justices, Williams does not
provide us a governing legal principle and this Court views the decision as limited to the unique
set of facts presented in that case.” Stanfield, 158 Idaho at 336.  The State’s argument would
impose the Williams plurality’s requirement that a statement must accuse or inculpate a
particular defendant for the statement to be testimonial,  contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court’s
holding in Stanfield that Williams does not provide a governing legal principle.
Despite the State’s unavailing arguments, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were testimonial
under the “primary purpose test” outlined in Davis.  Because Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were
testimonial, their admission was permitted under the Confrontation Clause only if Mr. Ringcamp
were unavailable and Ms. Tryon had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. See Stanfield,
158 Idaho at 332.  Here, even assuming Mr. Ringcamp was unavailable, Ms. Tryon did not have
a prior opportunity to cross-examine him.  Thus, Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were inadmissible.
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The  district  court  erred  when  it  permitted  the  admission,  through  Detective  Richardson,  of
Mr.  Ringcamp’s  statements,  because  that  violated  Ms.  Tryon’s  constitutional  right  to  confront
the witnesses against her.
D. The  State  Has  Not  Proven  That  The  Admission  Of  Mr.  Ringcamp’s  Statements  Is
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Ms. Tryon asserts the State has not proven that the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s
statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State argues, “[d]ue to the strength of the circumstantial evidence showing that the
white crystalline substance found in [Ms.] Tryon’s purse was methamphetamine, even if this
Court finds error in the admission of [Mr.] Ringcamp’s statements, it should conclude that,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the statements did not contribute to the verdict.”  (Resp. Br., p.16.)
This argument by the State on appeal ignores the importance the State placed on
Mr. Ringcamp’s statements before the district court.  As examined in the Appellant’s Brief (App.
Br., pp.16-17), the State during its closing argument advised the jury to consider Mr. Ringcamp’s
statements, and revisited the statements several times.  (See Tr., p.288, Ls.24-25, p.289, Ls.8-17,
p.290, Ls.19-21, p.328, Ls.24-25, p.329, Ls.2-18, p.331, Ls.22-24.)  That the State presented
other  circumstantial  evidence  does  not  diminish  the  value  of  Mr.  Ringcamp’s  statements  as
supporting the State’s argument that the substance at issue was methamphetamine.
Because Mr. Ringcamp’s statements were important circumstantial evidence for the
State, there is a reasonable possibility the admission of the statements contributed to Ms. Tryon’s
conviction. See State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  Thus, Ms. Tryon asserts the State has not proven that the admission of
Mr. Ringcamp’s statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The district court erred when it permitted the admission of Mr. Ringcamp’s statements
touching on the identity of the substance at issue, because that violated Ms. Tryon’s
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her.  Thus, Ms. Tryon’s conviction for
possession of a controlled substance should be vacated, and the matter should be remanded to the
district court for a new trial.
II.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Support Ms. Tryon’s Conviction For
Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Ms. Tryon asserts the State did not present sufficient evidence to support her conviction
for possession of a controlled substance.  The jury could not properly find that the substance at
issue here was methamphetamine. See State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134 (Ct. App. 1997).
The State argues, “[b]ased on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the state
provided substantial evidence upon which a rational [trier] of fact could conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the white crystalline substance found in [Ms.] Tryon’s purse was
methamphetamine.”  (Resp. Br., p.19.)  The State includes Mr. Ringcamp’s erroneously admitted
statements  in  its  analysis.   (See Resp. Br., p.19.)  However, even when considering those
erroneously admitted statements alongside the rest of the evidence, see McDaniel v. Brown, 558
U.S. 120, 131 (2010), the State did not present sufficient evidence to support Ms. Tryon’s
conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
The State did not present sufficient evidence, largely for the reasons discussed in the
Appellant’s Brief (App. Br., pp.21-22), which are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
Additionally, the State did not present evidence that Mr. Ringcamp himself had previous
experience with methamphetamine, or had been involved in previous methamphetamine
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transactions. Cf. Mitchell, 130 Idaho at 136-37 (noting the State’s confidential informant witness
testified he had used methamphetamine five or six times, and bought methamphetamine from the
defendant  at  least  three  times,  before  the  incident  at  issue).   Even  taking  Mr.  Ringcamp’s
statements and the rest of Detective Richardson’s testimony together, the State did not present
sufficient evidence from which the jury could properly find that the substance here
was methamphetamine.
The State did not present sufficient evidence to support Ms. Tryon’s conviction for
possession of a controlled substance.  Thus, the judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance should be vacated, and the matter should be remanded to the district court
for the entry of a judgment of acquittal on that charge.
CONCLUSION
For  the  above  reasons,  as  well  as  the  reasons  contained  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,
Ms. Tryon respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, and remand the matter to the district court for a new trial.  Alternatively,
Ms. Tryon respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, and remand the matter to the district court for the entry of a judgment
of acquittal.
DATED this 15th day of September, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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